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Abstract
The model of Nielsen and Ninomiya claims that “the SSC (Super-
conducting Supercollider) were stopped by the US Congress due to the
backward causation from the big amounts of Higgs particles, which it
would have produced, if it had been allowed to run”. They also pro-
posed to play a card game and if the “close LHC” card is drawn (with
probability ∼ 10−6), really close LHC on the eve of Higgs particle
discovery to avoid more severe bad luck. Crazy? Probably. But para-
phrasing Salvador Dali, if you believe that you and me are smarter
in physics than Nielsen and Ninomiya, don’t read this article, just go
right on in your blissful idiocy. Therefore, I will try to make sense of
backward causation. It turns out that not only the backward causa-
tion makes perfect sense in some models of possible reality, but that
Nielsen and Ninomiya really have a chance to close LHC by a card
game. The only thing they need is to be smart enough to manage
to develop their theory up to the level of brilliance beginning from
which it becomes a part of the fabric of reality. We hope, however,
that they will use their outstanding abilities to bring about some more
interesting future.
1 Introduction
In a number of seemingly crackpot papers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], Nielsen and Ni-
nomiya have developed a theory that is undoubtedly crazy. But craziness
is not always the reason to reject a theory. If it were we would not have
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neither relativity nor quantum mechanics today. Nielsen and Ninomiya base
their theory over Feynman’s approach to quantum mechanics which at first
sight also seems crazy. Freeman Dyson recollects: Thirty-one years ago,
Dick Feynman told me about his “sum over histories” version of quantum
mechanics. “The electron does anything it likes,” he said. “It just goes in
any direction at any speed, forward or backward in time, however it likes,
and then you add up the amplitudes and it gives you the wave-function.” I
said to him, “You’re crazy.” But he wasn’t [6]. Therefore, let us take closer
look to the idea of Nielsen and Ninomiya.
According to Feynman’s approach to quantum mechanics [7], to find the
probability Pba for a quantum system’s transition from a state |a > to a state
|b >, Nature applies three simple rules:
• Explore all “paths” connecting |a > to |b >.
• A complex number of unit magnitude
A(Path) = exp
(
i
~
S(Path)
)
, (1)
called the amplitude, is prescribed to each path.
• The probability Pba = |A|2 is proportional to the squared modulus of
the complex number A which is just the sum
A =
∑
allpaths
A(Path). (2)
The quantity S(Path) plays the central role in the above scheme and
is called action. Usually it is assumed that the action is a real number.
Therefore all paths connecting |a > to |b > are equivalent in a sense that
all these complex numbers have unit magnitude and hence if we restrict the
system in such a way that the only one path connecting |a > and |b > remains
then Pba(Path) = const. irrespective of the path chosen. However, the phases
of amplitudes may be different and when there are many paths connecting
|a > and |b >, the probability Pba depends strongly on how these amplitudes
interfere with each other.
The novelty of Nielsen and Ninomiya’s approach is that they ask what
will happen if we allow imaginary part in the action. Then the equality of
paths is broken down because Pba(Path) ∼ exp [−2 Im(S)/~] and certain
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trajectories whose actions have large positive imaginary parts will be highly
suppressed.
There is nothing bizarre or unprecedented in considering imaginary parts
of the actions. It was shown by Schwinger long ago [8] that the effective action
for a constant electric field develops a positive imaginary part. Schwinger
interpreted this imaginary part as an indication that the QED vacuum in
a background electric field is unstable and in strong enough fields a kind
of vacuum electrical breakdown due to spontaneous electron-positron pair
production takes place [9].
The imaginary part of the action arises also quite naturally in the WKB
description of quantum tunneling. In a tunneling event there are two sep-
arated classical turning points which are joined by a classically forbidden
trajectory. The probability of tunneling is related to the imaginary part of
the action for this classically forbidden trajectory. The most impressive ap-
plication of this kind of the imaginary part of the action is, probably, the
derivation of the Hawking radiation as a tunneling event [10].
Of course, it will be very interesting to experimentally confirm Schwin-
ger’s insight about the imaginary part of the Euler-Heisenberg-Schwinger
(EHS) action because there are some theoretically embarrassing moments
about this effective action. Namely, the effective EHS action exhibits myste-
rious statistics reversal: beginning from a microscopic theory of fermion pair
vacuum fluctuations we end with the effective EHS action which have a form
typical for bosons in a thermal bath, while for the spin-0 effective action the
form is typical for fermions in a thermal bath [11]. Besides, the temperature
of the thermal bath itself differs from the corresponding Hawking-Unruh tem-
perature by a factor two and nobody knows why [11]. Interestingly, Schwinger
mechanism seems to be testable experimentally in graphene which mimics
effective relativity with massless fermions [12].
The use of imaginary part of the action by Nielsen and Ninomiya is,
however, conceptually different. They want this imaginary part to suppress
all histories of the universe except a few, ideally just one history, with pre-
selected initial conditions. Such a super-theory will be superdeterministic:
if you know exact form of action, both real and imaginary parts, you can
predict everything which will happen or happened in this universe.
Of course Nielsen and Ninomiya do not yet have such a theory and I
doubt they ever will. However, they develop an embryonic version of it which
predicts a large positive imaginary part of the action for every history in
which large numbers of Higgs bosons are produced. Therefore, such histories
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are exponentially suppressed and never realized.
Up to this point, Nielsen and Ninomiya’s theory, although extravagant,
is completely scientific. Moreover, it has a great virtue which every good
scientific theory is supposed should have: it is falsifiable. It makes a strong
prediction that LHC will never succeed in production of large numbers of
Higgs bosons.
However, Nielsen and Ninomiya go beyond this point. They claim that
the real reason why the SSC (Superconducting Supercollider) was canceled
by USA Congress was that if it had been allowed to run it would have pro-
duced big amounts of Higgs particles and such a history is suppressed by the
corresponding large imaginary part in the action. Similarly, a bad luck is
awaiting to LHC too. To avoid severe potentially harmful accidents which
can “naturally” stop LHC if their theory is true, Nielsen and Ninomiya sug-
gest to play a card game. Take about one million cards most of which say
“Go on with LHC, discover Higgs boson and be happy” but few of them
prescribe some restrictions on allowed LHC energy or luminosity. And just
one card says “Stop LHC and never turn it on”. If the “Close LHC” card is
drawn, this improbable event, according to Nielsen and Ninomiya, will indi-
cate that their theory of imaginary action is true and we must really close
LHC, otherwise some natural or political catastrophic event will do it instead
of us.
What we can say about this borderline-crackpot suggestion? First, it does
not follow from the Nielsen and Ninomiya’s particular form of the imaginary
action. This action simply says that any history with large amounts of pro-
duced Higgs particles is extremely improbable. But there is nothing in it
which indicates that the history in which LHC is closed by Nielsen and Ni-
nomiya’s card game is more probable than the history in which LHC is simply
blown up by terrorists: in both case the LHC will be unable to produce Higgs
particles and frankly speaking the second case gives even more guarantees
that it never will. Therefore, Nielsen and Ninomiya here are implicitly as-
suming that we have free will to choose between histories whose imaginary
actions are close enough and somehow the histories with less harm to humans
are more probable.
Besides, there is one logical loophole in the argumentation of Nielsen and
Ninomiya. Suppose their theory is true and all universe histories with big
chunks of produced Higgs particles are exponentially suppressed. Does then
it mean that LHC will never be able to produce significant amount of Higgs
particles? Not necessarily, in light of Multiverse theory.
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The Multiverse theory [14, 15, 16] is in every bit more miraculous than
Nielsen and Ninomiya’s theory. For example it predicts that about 1010
29
m
away there is an exact copy of your [15] reading the copy of this article.
Nevertheless, the Multiverse theory is considered as completely respectable,
even mainstream theory and many prominent physicists are confident in it.
For example, Martin Rees is sufficiently confident about the multiverse to
bet his dog’s life on it, Andrei Linde is ready to bet his own life, and Steven
Weinberg has just enough confidence to bet the lives of both Andrei Linde
and Martin Rees’s dog [14].
The Multiverse theory has two implications for the Nielsen and Nino-
miya’s hypothesis. Firstly, it asserts that there is a parallel universe in which
the Nielsen and Ninomiya’s card game has been already played and as a re-
sult of the game’s outcome the analog of LHC was closed (however this does
not prove that Nielsen and Ninomiya’s imaginary action theory is true. Even
without this theory, there is a non-zero probability that certain authorities
can make a foolish decision). Secondly, even if Nielsen and Ninomiya’s theory
is true, there exists a universe in which the exponentially small probability
that LHC will be successful is realized. To the delight of high-energy physi-
cists, there is no reason why this universe could not be our own.
Therefore, I think, we have every reason not to worry about LHC card
games. The Multiverse theory kills the super-determinism of the Nielsen
and Ninomiya’s proposal. In fact, we could not compute our own future
even if we had the knowledge of the entire state of multiverse, because there
are infinitely many copies of us and our universe and their histories will
eventually deviate, but there is no way to determine what particular copy
you and me belong to [15].
However, there is one aspect of the Nielsen and Ninomiya’s theory which
deserves to be further scrutinized. They interpret a possible stoppage of LHC
by a card game as an example of backward causality, that some event in
future (production of Higgs particles) prearranges conditions today in order
not to happen. Does this make sense? We need some analysis of the notion
of causality to answer this question.
2 What is time?
Causality is intimately related with the notion of time. Therefore, the first
question we should try to answer is about the origin of time. Most of the
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modern physicists are, perhaps, pretty sure that they know what is time: it
is just forth dimension of space-time different from the spatial dimensions
in a subtle way summarized in the pseudo-euclidean character of the metric.
This attitude goes back to Minkowski: “Henceforth space by itself, and time
by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of
union of the two will preserve an independent reality” [17].
Ordinary man, however, will not object if I say that space and time are
two big differences. “What is meant by the word ’Time’? There is no sci-
entific answer to this question. What is meant by the word ’Space’? Here,
rational thought may possibly provide us with an answer. Yet a connection
exists between Destiny and Time, and also between Space and Causality.
What, then, is the relationship between Destiny and Cause? The answer to
this is fundamental to the concept of depth experience, but it lies beyond
all manners of scientific experience and communication. The fact of depth
experience is as indisputable as it is inexplicable” [18]. As we see, Spengler
thinks that it is particularly difficult to understanding the concept of time.
How fortunate that you and me can live, and sometimes even live very suc-
cessfully, without thinking on such complicated issues. “The active person
lives in the world of phenomena and with it. He does not require logical
proofs, indeed he often cannot understand them” [18].
However, the concept of background Minkowski space-time was extraor-
dinary successful in the realm of physics. How much has it enlightened the
enigma of time? The most complete exposition of what the special theory
of relativity has to say about space-time can be found in the great treatise
of Alfred Robb “A Theory of Time and Space” [19]. He used an axiomatic
approach and, in fact, has been nicknamed “the Euclid of Relativity” [20].
The basic concept, introduced by Robb, which is at the heart of causal struc-
ture of special relativity, is the notion of “Conical Order” [20]. This notion
emphasizes an important difference between simultaneity and succession of
spatially separated events. Einstein bewildered contemporaries by showing
that simultaneity is relative. Conical order, however, enables to introduce
an absolute succession between events and define the notions of after and
before which are not relative but absolute. Physicists were so mesmerized by
Einstein’s great discovery that Robb remains up to now an forgotten hero of
relativity. Nevertheless, as the founder of causal theory of time [21], the con-
tribution of Alfred Robb in relativity deserves to be considered as important
as achievements of Einstein and Minkowski.
As for Einstein, the devil seduced him to develop general theory of rela-
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tivity to obscure again the problem of time.
Space-time in general relativity is a four-dimensional pseudo-Riemannian
manifold. Its symmetric metric tensor gµν is dynamical in the sense that it
is determined by matter distribution according to the Einstein equations
Rµν − 1
2
gµνR =
8piG
c4
Tµν . (3)
If the energy-momentum tensor Tµν in the right-hand side of this equation
is related to the motion of a point particle then equation of motion of this
particle follows from (3) itself due to Bianchi identities. This equation sim-
ply says that the particle moves along a geodesic. Therefore, beautifully
and miraculously, gravity in general relativity emerges as a manifestation of
space-time curvature. Usually this aspect of general relativity is considered
as revolutionary. However, it is not. As pioneered by Cartan and Friedrichs,
Newtonian gravity also can be cast in a generally covariant form in which
both characteristic features of general relativity, gravity as spacetime curva-
ture and dynamical metric, are realized [22].
What is really specific to general relativity is that the geometry of tangent
space to any point is Minkowskian, while in Newton-Cartan theory tangent
spaces have Galilean geometry. This makes a big difference as far as the issue
of time is concerned.
Newton-Cartan space-times are globally hyperbolic with absolute time
and fixed causal structure. In the case of general relativity, the nice Minkow-
ski geometry of tangent spaces allows to introduce conical order and hence
causal structures in these tangent spaces. However, it is not clear whether
for every pseudo-Riemannian space-time, which follows from the Einstein’s
equations (3), these local causal structures could be integrated in a global
definition of time.
Indeed, Go¨del found a solution that has closed timelike curves through
every event [23]. Therefore, our intuitive understanding what time is breaks
down in the Go¨del’s universe as we cannot define the meanings of ’before’
and ’after’ for events globally.
Quantum mechanics brings another flavor in the problem of time. Time
plays a special role in quantum theory. Unlike spatial coordinates, time can
not be represented by a self-adjoint operator and, therefore, is not a physical
observable in the normal sense. Pauli’s argument that this is indeed so goes as
follows [24]. Suppose there exist a self-adjoint operator Tˆ canonical conjugate
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to the Hamiltonian Hˆ. Then we should have
[Hˆ, Tˆ ] = i~. (4)
But this commutation relation shows that if |E > is an energy eigenstate,
then
exp
(
i
h
E1Tˆ
)
|E >
is also energy eigenstate but with energy eigenvalue E − E1. Therefore,
any such operator necessarily implies that the spectrum of Hamiltonian is
not bounded from below which excludes most physically interesting systems
since they are assumed to have a stable ground state.
Although Pauli’s “theorem” is not mathematically rigorous and there is
a loophole in it [24, 25], time undoubtedly plays a subtle role in quantum
mechanics. In general relativity, space-time coordinates are mere labels at-
tached to events and true physical results are assumed to be independent of
choices of such coordinates. This fact creates problems for interpretation of
the meaning of time already at classical level and it is not surprising that the
problem of time only becomes more acute when we try to merge quantum
mechanics and general relativity in quantum gravity [26].
To conclude, “Although time is a concept that attracted and occupied
the thoughts of a countless number of thinkers and scholars over centuries,
its true nature still remains wrapped in a shroud of mystery” [27].
3 Are our theories casual?
Anybody who thinks that causality and determinism are simple and trans-
parent notions should consult John Earman’s A primer on determinism to
find out that determinism is a vague concept and causation is a truly obscure
one [28]. We will not try to enter any deeply into these wilds but only scratch
the surface of the problem.
It is usually thought that the classical physics is a paradise for determin-
ism and spacial relativity and quantum physics have spoiled this harmony.
Just the contrary. Newtonian world is quite hostile to determinism, quantum
mechanics is more deterministic than classical mechanics, and special relativ-
ity is our best theory where the most dreams of determinism can be realized.
To these dreams, however, general relativity poses new grave challenges [28].
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let us briefly indicate just a few examples of acausal behavior of seemingly
benign Newtonian systems.
Imagine a system of two equal masses M moving in the x−y plane under
Newton’s inverse square force law and the mirror replica of this binary placed
symmetrically at a large distance. The fifth mass m ≪ M is placed on the
z-axis which goes through the centers of mass of the planar binary systems.
In his efforts to solve the century-old problem of noncollisional singulari-
ties, Xia was able to show [29] that there exists a set of the initial conditions
for which the four bodies, constituting binaries in the above construction,
will escape to spatial infinity in a finite time, while the fifth small body will
oscillate back and forth between these binaries with ever increasing speed.
However classical mechanics is time reversal invariant and the time reverse
of the Xia’s construction is an example of “space invaders” [30], particles
appearing from spatial infinity in a surprise attack without any apparent
cause.
Another example is given by Pe´rez Laraudogoitia’s beautiful supertask
[31]. An infinite set of identical particles is arranged in a straight line. The
distance between the particles and their sizes decrease so that the whole sys-
tem occupies an interval of unit length. Some other particle of the same
mass approaches the system with unit velocity. A wave of elastic collisions
goes through the system in unit time and all particles come to rest after this
collision supertask is over. The time reversal of the Pe´rez Laraudogoitia’s
supertask implies indeterminism because it is the following process: a spon-
taneous self-excitation propagates through the infinite system of balls at rest
causing the first ball to be ejected with some nonzero velocity.
Surprisingly, quantum mechanics is more friendly to determinism than
the Newtonian mechanics [32]. Supertasks are possible in quantum mechan-
ics too [33], and there are quantum supertasks in which the spontaneous
self-excitation of the ground state is allowed [34]. However, pathologies dis-
appear and the quantum mechanical supertasks are better behaved than their
classical counterparts if one demands normalizability of the state vector [34].
Let us mention also Norton’s fascinating example [35, 36]. Suppose an
equation of motion for a Newtonian particle is (Norton provides a concrete
dome-like construction which leads to this equation of motion)
d2r
dt2
= k
√
r, (5)
where k is some dimensionful constant. If the particle is initially at rest at the
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origin r = 0, then the obvious solution of (5) is r(t) = 0. But, surprisingly,
there is also a whole class of other solutions
r(t) =


0, if t ≤ T,
k2
144
(t− T )4, if t > T.
(6)
It is easy to check that (6) is a solution of (6) with required initial conditions
for any T > 0. But then we have an amusing situation: a particle sitting at
the apex of the Norton’s dome in the gravitational field begins to move spon-
taneously, without any cause, at an arbitrary time t = T , in some arbitrary
radial direction.
Norton’s dome illustrates well that our implicit beliefs in causality de-
mands some kind of smooth structures (Norton’s dome is C1 but not C2 at
the apex). Non-smooth structures open a Pandora box of very strange ob-
jects like the Devil’s staircase [37]. Devil’s staircase implies a possibility for
a particle to advance forward with a continuous constant velocity which is
zero nearly everywhere! Nevertheless, such Cantor functions are not merely
pathological oddities as they appear naturally in various areas of mathemat-
ics and mathematical physics.
The problem with smooth structures is that for 4-dimensional manifolds
there exist different, not diffeomorphic to each other, smoothnesses and what
is smooth in one smoothness is not smooth in another. However, there is no
physical ground to favor one smoothness over another [38, 39].
To conclude, causality is not a simple notion. Over the centuries there
were hard efforts to distillate and make transparent the principle of causality
and there is “such a history of persistent failure that only the rashest could
possibly expect a viable, factual principle still to emerge” [40].
4 Backward causality
At first sight backward causality does not makes sense. However, let us take
the following example [41]. Suppose your son was on a ship that has gone
down in the ocean two hours previously according to the radio broadcast you
just listened. The broadcast have mentioned that there were a few survivors.
I expect you immediately to utter a prayer to almighty God that you son
should have been among the survivors, and I affirm that such a behavior is
the most natural thing in the world.
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However, it is logically impossible to alter the past and such a prayer is
blasphemous according to orthodox Jewish theologians [41], because we are
asking God to perform an impossible thing.
Christian tradition, on the other hand, will bless such a prayer. Are
Christians less logical and at error in this case?
If you don’t like the theological example, Dummett provides a magical
one [41]. Imagine a tribe that has the following initiation ritual. Every
second year the young men have to go off for six days. They travel for the
first two days to some isolated place. Then they hunt lions to confirm their
manhood. Last two days they spent on the return journey.
The chief of the tribe believes he can influence the outcome of the test if
he dance and all the time he eagerly performs this ritual. The weird thing is
that the chief continues these dances for the whole six days. In our opinion,
the dancing can not bring about the young men’s bravery and, therefore,
the chief has wholly mistaken system of causal beliefs. In particular, we
consider as especially absurd an idea to continue the dance for last two days
after the lion hunting is already over. Can we persuade the chief on the
empirical ground that his behavior is absurd? Dummett argues that we can
not. The interpretation of empirical data depends on some deeply rooted
conceptual beliefs or prejudices. “If we were as convinced as he is of the
existence of sorcerers and of mysterious powers, instead of believing in so-
called natural causes, his inferences would seem to us perfectly reasonable.
As a matter of fact, primitive man is no more logical or illogical than we are.
His presuppositions are not the same as ours, and that is what distinguishes
him from us” [42].
One of the presuppositions which we take for granted is that the past
is fixed in every detail and can not be changed. I agree that under such
presupposition backward causality does not make sense. However, is it an
absolute logical necessity to stick to this prejudice?
5 A model for backward causality
In fact, such a model was suggested in [43] and is based on a wild but not im-
possible (especially in the multiverse theory) idea that we live in a computer
simulation [44, 45]. During all the history, ancestor worship was very strong
religious tradition. it is not unbelievably unrealistic that enormous amounts
of computing power will be available in the future. “One thing that later
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generations might do with their super-powerful computers is run detailed
simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their
computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simula-
tions. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be
if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely
accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be
the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the orig-
inal race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an
original race” [44].
Now suppose that this high tech substitute of the ancestor worship is self-
adaptive. I mean that the rules of this game (which we call natural laws) are
not fixed forever but can change defending the participants’ creative output.
So to say, we are co-creators of this world not just passive actors. Of cause
such a world view is strongly anti-Copernicean, contrary to the last centuries
scientific mainstream, but I find nothing particularly impossible in it.
In such a virtual reality the past is not fixed in every detail, otherwise
it would be a foolish waste of computer memory. Backward causality is a
natural thing in such a universe: some details of the past are fixed only when
we pay our attention to them from the future.
6 Concluding remarks
Can Nielsen and Ninomiya bring about the closure of LHC by a card game?
Yes they can if we live in a kind of virtual universe outlined above. However,
our experience with scientific exploration of the world indicates that there is
some highly aesthetic underling principles of the fabric of this computer game.
Therefore, Nielsen and Ninomiya have to work hard to meet this standards.
But are such efforts worthwhile if only LHC closer is at the stake?
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